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ABSTRACT
The problem of adversarial examples, evasion attacks on machine
learning classifiers, has proven extremely difficult to solve. This
is true even in the black-box threat model, as is the case in many
practical settings. Here, the classifier is hosted as a remote service
and and the adversary does not have direct access to the model
parameters.
This paper argues that in such settings, defenders have a much
larger space of actions than have been previously explored. Specifi-
cally, we deviate from the implicit assumption made by prior work
that a defense must be a stateless function that operates on individ-
ual examples, and explore the possibility for stateful defenses.
To begin, we develop a defense designed to detect the process of
generating adversarial examples. By keeping a history of the past
queries, a defender can try to identify when a sequence of queries
appears to be for the purpose of generating an adversarial example.
We then introduce query blinding, a new class of attacks designed
to bypass defenses that rely on such a defense approach.
We believe that expanding the study of adversarial examples
from stateless classifiers to stateful systems is not onlymore realistic
for many black-box settings, but also gives the defender a much-
needed advantage in responding to the adversary.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, neural networks have driven advancement
in a wide range of domains. Deep learning based methods have
achieved state of the art performance in areas including, game-
playing AIs for Go and chess [35], machine translation between
different languages [40], and classification and object detection for
images [33].
Accordingly, neural networks are also increasingly used in safety-
critical applications, where the reliable performance of these net-
works and their security against amalicious adversary is paramount.
In some cases, such as a local image recognition system, the net-
work and its parameters may be available to the adversary (the
white-box case). However, when the classifier is hosted remotely
(e.g., as a cloud service), only the output of the neural network is
available to the adversary (the black-box case).
Worryingly, these neural networks have been shown to be highly
vulnerable to adversarial examples: inputs crafted by an adversary
to deliberately fool a machine learning classifier. Defending against
adversarial examples has proven to be extremely difficult. Most
defenses that have been published have been found to have signif-
icant flaws [3, 9], and even those few defenses that have thus far
withstood validation offer only partial robustness [30].
Adversarial examples might not actually be problematic in prac-
tice, where models are often held private by companies and hosted
on the cloud. However, surprisingly, adversarial examples can even
be generated in a fully black-box threat model. Such an adversary
in this threat model can only make queries of the model and receive
the predicted classification label as output. While there certainly
are domains where the adversary will have white-box access to a
deployed neural network, in many production environments when
neural networks are deployed, the user is only allowed to make
queries of the classifier and observe the output. For example, ser-
vices such as Clarifai [13] and Google Cloud Vision AI [19] offer
image classification APIs where users can submit images and re-
ceive only the label of that image. Similarly, for spam classification,
a feature offered by many email providers, a user cannot directly
access the actual spam classifier, but only observe whether an email
is classified as spam or not.
This paper studies the problem of detecting the generation of
adversarial examples, as opposed to trying to (statelessly) detect
whether or not any individual input is malicious—which has proven
to be difficult [9]. To do this, we consider the task of identifying
the sequence of queries made to the classifier when creating an
adversarial example. The central hypothesis we evaluate is whether
the sequence of queries used to generate a black-box adversarial
example is distinguishable from the sequence of queries when under
benign use.
Operating under this hypothesis, we propose a defense that re-
lies on the specific observation that existing black-box attacks often
make a sequence of highly self-similar queries (i.e., each query in
the sequence is similar to prior queries in the sequence). We train a
similarity-detector neural network to identify such query patterns,
and find that the existing state-of-the-art black-box adversarial
example attack algorithms can be easily detected through this strat-
egy. Our proposed strategy can trivially compose with any existing
defense for defense-in-depth.
Then, we study adaptive attacks against our scheme, to under-
stand whether an attacker who is aware of our detection strategy
could evade it. We develop query blinding, a general strategy for
attacking defenses which monitor the sequence of queries in order
to detect adversarial example generation. Query blinding attacks
pre-process each input with a blinding function before querying
the classifier, so that (1) the pre-processed inputs match the benign
data patterns, but (2) it is possible to deduce the classifier’s output
from the result of these queries. We show that our defense remains
secure against query blinding.
Given the difficulty in defending or detecting attacks statelessly,
we believe that this new research direction—stateful methods for
detecting black-box attacks—presents renewed hope for defending
against adversarial example attacks in the black-box threat model.
We make the following contributions:
• We propose a new class of adversarial example defenses:
stateful detection defenses.
• We design and evaluate a defense in this category, and find it
is effective at detecting existing attacks and is hard to evade
even when the attacker adapts the attack approach.
• We introduce query blinding, a general strategy that can be
used to attack stateful detection defenses.
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• We release the source-code for our defense and attacks at
https://github.com/schoyc/blackbox-detection.
2 BACKGROUND & PROBLEM STATEMENT
This paper studies evasion attacks on neural networks [5], com-
monly referred to as adversarial examples [36].
2.1 Preliminaries
Neural Networks. A neural network is a function f (·) consisting
of multiple layers. Each layer computes a weighted linear combina-
tion of the outputs of the previous layer, followed by a non-linearity.
Because neural networks can have arbitrarily many layers, as well
as various non-lineariaties, they can provably approximate arbi-
trarily complicated functions. The weights θ of a neural network
refer to the parameters used in the weighted linear combinations.
To be explicit we may write fθ (·) to refer to the network f (·) with
weights θ . Most of the recent impressive results in machine learning
have come from applying neural networks [33, 35, 40]. This paper
focuses on classification neural networks, where some example x
is processed by the neural network to return the predicted label
y = f (x) of the example.
Training Neural Networks. A neural network begins with ran-
domly initializedweightsθ . Training a neural network is the process
of iteratively updating the weights to better solve the given task.
Neural networks are most often trained with stochastic gradient
descent. Given a set of labeled training examples X with examples
xi and corresponding labels yi , gradient descent attempts to solve
arg min
θ
E
(x,y)∈X
ℓ
(
fθ (x),y
)
where ℓ(·)measures the loss: intuitively, how “wrong” the prediction
fθ (x) is compared to the true label y. Stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) solves the above problem by iteratively updating the weights
θ ← θ − ε · ∇θ
( ∑
(x,y)∈B
ℓ
(
fθ (x),y
) )
where ∇θ is the gradient of the loss with respect to the weights
θ ; B ⊂ X is a randomly selected mini-batch of training examples
drawn i.i.d. from X; and ε is the learning rate which controls by
how much the weights θ should be changed.
Adversarial Examples. To formalize the definition of adversarial
examples, most existing work [3, 18, 30] defines an adversarial
example as an input x ′, which is a slightly modified version of a
naturally occurring example x , such that a neural network classifies
them differently. Formally, an adversarial example x ′ satisfies two
properties: (1) for some d(·), a distance metric, d(x ,x ′) < ε , but (2)
for the neural network, f (x) , f (x ′). As long as ε is set to be small
enough, the perturbation that is introduced should not change the
actual true classification of the object in the image (e.g. a dog with
small perturbations is still a dog).
Generating Adversarial Examples. The problem of generating
adversarial examples can be formalized as a minimization problem
δ∗ = arg max
δ
ℓ(f (x + δ ),y)
subject to the constraint that ∥δ ∥ is small according to some metric.
White-box attacks to generate adversarial examples largely rely
on using the same gradient-descent process used to train a neural
network. Initially, we set δ0 = 0 and then update
δi+1 = δi + ∇x ℓ(f (x + δi ),y)
for some chosen loss function ℓ.
Black-box attacks, by definition, are unable to perform the above
optimization because they are not able to compute the gradient
of the loss. Instead, black-box attacks must perform gradient-free
optimization. This paper considers two possible state-of-the-art
black-box attacks: NES [22] and the BoundaryAttack [6]. While
their implementations differ (significantly so), at a very high level
they both rely on the same strategy. Starting from some initial
perturbationδ0, the attacks slowly query the classifier on a sequence
of perturbations f (x +δi ), each highly similar to the previous, with
the objective of finding an input that is (a) misclassified and (b)
introduces a small distortion.
A thorough understanding of these black-box attacks is not
necessary yet; we defer a complete description to Section 6.
Problem Domain: Image Classification. Following most prior
work on the space of adversarial examples [3], this paper studies
the domain of image classification. Here, images are represented as
h ·w · c dimensional vectors (with height h, width w , and c color
channels) drawn from [0, 1]hwc .
2.2 Threat Model
As discussed earlier, we focus on detecting black-box attacks for
crafting adversarial examples. In a black-box threat model, the ad-
versary can query themodel on any input and learn its classification,
but the weights and parameters of the model are not released. We
envision, for example, a platform that makes available a machine
learning model as a service, where the model can be queried by
a user after he/she creates an account, but cannot download the
model itself. Under this threat model, we aim to increase the diffi-
culty for attackers to craft adversarial examples. While an attacker
can query the model any number of times in trying to generate an
adversarial example, our goal is to detect such attacks before they
are successful.
We focus on an account-oriented setting, where usersmust create
an account before they can query the model. Attackers might be
able to create as many accounts as they wish, but we assume there
is some practical cost associated with creating each account (e.g.,
linking to a valid credit card or phone number, paying an account
fee, etc.). In our scheme, the attacker’s account is cancelled as soon
as an attack-in-progress is detected, requiring the attacker to create
a new account at that point. A key metric for the effectiveness of
our defense is the number of accounts that an attacker must create
to successfully craft an adversarial example. Each time the attack
is detected, the attacker must create a new account, so we measure
this by counting the number of times the attack is detected before it
is successful (number of detections); this determines the attacker’s
cost to defeat the system.
Notice that our goal of detecting when an adversarial attack is in
progress over a sequence of queries to the model is different from
detecting whether or not any individual input is adversarial (as in
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previous detection based defenses [9]). Thus, our scheme involves
retaining history of prior queries and scanning this history to check
for patterns that indicate if an attack is in progress. Such a defense
is not feasible in the white-box threat model, where the defenders
have no visibility into the attacker’s offline computation.
We focus on the hard-label setting, where each query to the
model returns only the categorical label assigned by the classifier,
but not a numerical confidence score associated with it. Our ap-
proach would extend naturally to other settings, but as argued in
prior work [5] we believe the hard-label setting is the most realistic
black-box threat model. (We have some evidence (see Appendix E)
that solving the soft-label setting may be more challenging.)
There are two broad types of black-box attacks in the litera-
ture: query-based attacks, which make a sequence of queries to the
model, and zero-query attacks, which work entirely offline without
interacting with the model. While significant prior work has been
dedicated to constructing defenses against the latter [37], limited
work studies defenses against query-based attacks. Our main con-
tributions lie in studying defenses against query-based attacks. Our
approach, monitoring the sequence of queries against the classifier,
by definition can not detect zero-query attacks.
2.3 Query-Based Attacks
Our defense is motivated by the sequential nature of query-based
black box adversarial attacks, such as NES [22] and the Boundary
Attack [6]. Query attacks iteratively perturb a source example to
slowly transform it into an adversarial example according to some
policy, usually by estimating gradients or boundary proximity. This
information is inferred by querying points near the current pro-
posed adversarial example.
Considering attack queries as a sequence, successive queries are
likely to be close together (by some distance metric), because (1)
each iteration of the attack makes a small gradient-estimation step
or boundary-following step from the current proposed adversarial
example to the next proposed example; and (2) since only labels are
accessible, the attack requires querying a random sample of points
near the current example to approximate the actual gradient or
decision boundaries of the model. Therefore, a scheme that tracks
the sequence of queries made to a model can detect an attack based
on an anomalous pattern of suspiciously close queries.
As a concrete example, to generate an adversarial example of
an input x , the label-only version of the NES attack [22] seeds the
attack with an input that is a different class than x , and then sequen-
tially takes “gradient” steps from the adversarial image towards the
original image to (1) reduce the distortion from the current example
to the original example x , but (2) so that the class remains the tar-
get class. Because obtaining the true gradient is not possible in the
hard-label setting, the attack uses NES, a gradient-free optimization
method, which estimates the gradient using the softmax scores
of a random sample of points nearby the original example x . For
this gradient estimation to be accurate, queries must necessarily be
made within a small distance of each other, which creates a pattern
that we will use to detect the NES attack.
2.4 Zero-Query Attacks
One of the most surprising properties of adversarial examples is
their transferability [18]: given two different models (even trained
on different datasets) for the same task, it turns out that adversarial
examples generated on one will often transfer to the other. This
observation motivated the earliest black-box attack algorithms:
train a “surrogate model” [32] on the same task as the target model,
perform a gradient-based attack on the surrogate model, and replay
this generated adversarial example on the target model. This zero-
query attack, while not 100% successful, is surprisingly effective.
As mentioned earlier, our approach cannot defend against trans-
fer attacks and other zero-query attacks. Fortunately, others have
proposed possible defenses to transfer attacks. Perhaps the best
known example is Ensemble Adversarial Training (EAT) [37] which
has been shown to be effective against zero-shot adversarial attacks.
The major limitation of zero-query defenses (including EAT) is
that they are not effective against query attacks. Thus, this prior
work of defenses targeting the zero-query threat model perfectly
complements our approach: we envision combining our defense
(to detect query-based attacks) with an existing defense (to detect
zero-query attacks). In Section 8 we combine EAT with our defense
to develop a complete defense to black-box adversarial examples.
3 OUR SCHEME
Wenow introduce and explain our scheme to detect black box, query
based, adversarial attacks by tracking the sequence of queries the
attacker makes in the process of generating an adversarial example.
3.1 The Query Detection Defense
At a high level, our defense is applied as an access monitor on
top of an existing classifier. The detector records all queries to the
classifier and stores them in a temporary history buffer. For each
new query, the detector computes the number of “nearby” examples
in this temporary history buffer. If we determine there are too many
nearby examples, we report this as part of an attack sequence and
take appropriate action (e.g., block this user’s account).
In more detail, for each user, we save every query from that
user for a bounded duration (this period can be tuned according
to the defender’s resources, for example either a fixed amount of
time or a fixed number of queries). Then, for each new query the
system receives, we compute its k-nearest-neighbor distance to the
previously seen examples—the mean pairwise distance between
the query and its k nearest neighbors among the previously saved
queries (i.e., for each of the k nearest neighbors, we compute the
distance between the neighbor and query, then take the mean over
these k distances).
To measure the distance between queries, we encode the queries
using a deep similarity encoder [4] (that maps perceptually similar
images to nearby points in a reduced dimensional space) and then
use the ℓ2 distance in this encoded space. If the mean distance falls
below a chosen threshold, we flag this query as a potential attempt
at generating an adversarial example. We choose the detection
threshold so that benign use of the classifier is not flagged. In
particular, we set the threshold so that if the entire training set
were to be randomly streamed as queries, 0.1% of the training
set would be flagged as attacks (i.e. the false positive rate would
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Figure 1: Query Detection Defense: The high-level process for detecting a query-based adversarial attack.
be 0.1%). 1 After an attack is detected, the buffer containing the
previously saved queries for that user can then be cleared. Moreover,
in response to the attempted attack, the user may then be banned
from the service either immediately, or after a random number of
subsequent queries, in order to reduce the attacker’s knowledge of
when exactly their attack was detected. A diagram of our scheme
is shown in Figure 1.
3.2 Similarity Encoder
A key question in the design of our method is the metric to use for
the k-nearest-neighbor search. Naively, we might imagine choosing
a simple metric—for example, the ℓ2 distance between two images.
However, using such a simple method has two drawbacks:
(1) Simple metrics, such as ℓ2, do not accurately capture distance
in adversarial situations and are too easy for an attacker to
evade. A small rotation or translation in pixel space can cause
dramatic changes according to the ℓ2 norm, which experi-
mentally we find allows an adversary to evade detection.
(2) Also, the ℓ2 distance requires storing an entire copy of ev-
ery queried image. This could pose a significant cost to the
hosting service in storage costs, and storing user queries for
longer than strictly necessary introduces potential privacy
risks.
To increase the security of our scheme, we use perceptual simi-
larity for nearest-neighbor search, as adversarial attacks involve
generating new images that are perceptually similar to the original
image. To measure the perceptual similarity of two images, we train
a deep neural network to encode images into a lower-dimensional
1In practice, a lower false positive rate may be necessary. However, some existing
defense research for detecting adversarial examples sets the false positive rate at
approximately 5% [42]. Our value is thus 50× lower than prior work.
space of dimension d , such that similar images are mapped to simi-
lar points in the encoded space. For example, for a given picture
of a dog, after rotating or translating the image slightly, the per-
ceptual content of the image is still the same (i.e., the same dog),
and we train the encoder so that both of these images have similar
d-dimensional representations.
This construction resolves both of the difficulties identified ear-
lier. By design, small modifications to an image are less likely to
cause dramatic increases in encoded-space ℓ2 distance. Further, be-
cause the encoded space is much smaller than the total image size,
this allows us to save on storage costs.
Encoder Setup & Training.We represent the encoder E(·) as
a neural network mapping images x ∈ Rh ·w ·c to an encoded space
e ∈ Rd of dimension d . As described, the objective of this encoder is
to map visually similar inputs x , x˜ to encodings e = E(x), e˜ = E(x˜)
that are similar under ℓ2 distance, so that ∥e − e˜∥2 is small.
To achieve this we train the similarity encoder neural network
with a contrastive loss function [4]. Specifically, we consider two
pairs of images. Pair 1 consists of xi , an image drawn from the
training set, and xp , a “positive” image perceptually similar to xi .
Pair 2 consists of a different training image x j , along with a negative
example xn , an image not perceptually similar to x j . The contrastive
loss for their encodings (ei , ep ), (ej , en ) is
L(xi ,xp ,x j ,xn ) = ∥ei − ep ∥22 +max(0,m2 − ∥ej − en ∥22).
The first term encourages similar encodings for positives and the
second term encourages different encodings for negatives by penal-
izing encodings less than a certain marginm apart for negatives.
3.3 Experimental Setup
We evaluate our defense on the CIFAR-10 dataset: a collection
of 60,000 low-resolution (32 × 32) color images drawn from 10
classes, so that each image is in [0, 1]32×32×3. We choose this dataset
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Figure 2: The mean k-neighbor distance (in encoded space)
of the 0.1% percentile of the CIFAR-10 training set as a func-
tion of k . We select the threshold k so that it is large enough
to support a wide margin, but not so large as to be computa-
tionally prohibitive.
for three reasons. First, CIFAR-10 is the most popular dataset for
studying adversarial examples [3]. Second, defenses on ImageNet
have thus far proven to be far beyond our current capabilities
[14], and no known neural network defense remains robust to
attack. Finally, training a network for CIFAR-10 is significantly less
computationally expensive than for ImageNet, allowing for us to
perform a wide range of experiments.
We train a ResNet classifier [21] on the CIFAR-10 dataset for
100 epochs with Adam [27] on a 1080 Ti GPU with Keras [12] and
TensorFlow [1], achieving 92% test accuracy.
3.4 Encoder Training and Threshold Selection
To train the similarity encoder for the scheme, we follow prior
work [4] and initialize our encoder with the same architecture and
weights as a network trained to classify the desired images. For
CIFAR-10, we first train a three-layer CNN (architecture given in
the appendix) for 100 epochs using data augmentation and reach a
validation accuracy of 76%. Then we remove the final layer and re-
place it with a new encoding layer of dimension d = 256. We found
a margin ofm =
√
10 experimentally resulted in the best encodings.
A more complex architecture might yield stronger results, but to
keep our initial design simple we use this CNN.
We fine-tune this neural network (with the replaced last layer)
to minimize the contrastive loss function described in Section 3.2,
with a learning rate α = 1e − 4, momentum µ = 0.9, and a batch
size of b = 32. To generate a batch of positive pairs for training,
we sample b images from the training set; then, a random image
transformation (that should retain the perceptual content of the
image) was selected and applied to each of the b images (similar
to traditional data augmentation used for network training). For
negative pairs, we sample b pairs (2b images total) of different
images. The transformations used are enumerated in Section 5.1.
Parameter Selection. The choice ofk , the number of neighbors,
affects the effectiveness of our scheme. Large values can potentially
improve the effectiveness of our scheme at detecting attacks (since
larger k allows a larger threshold while maintaining 0.1% false
positive rate, thus forcing the attacker’s images to be very different
to avoid detection). However, k is the minimum number of queries
before our defense could possibly flag a possible attack, so smaller
values of k can potentially enable faster detection of attacks; and
smaller values of k reduce the computational cost of calculating
the k-neighbor distance. Therefore, a smaller k should be preferred
whenever possible.
We show in Figure 2 the threshold needed to ensure a 0.1% false
positive rate, as a function of k . Larger values of the threshold
constrain the attacker more sharply if the attacker wishes to avoid
detection, so the larger the threshold the better. We can see that
this threshold increases sharply until about k = 50, where the
distance begins to plateau and marginally continues to increase as
k increases. Therefore, we select k = 50.
4 NON-ADAPTIVE EVALUATION
Having described our defense proposal, we begin by demonstrating
that it has at least some potential utility: it effectively detects exist-
ing (unmodified) black-box query attacks. While there are many
black-box (hard-label) attacks, they fall roughly into two categories:
• Gradient estimation attacks at their core operate like stan-
dard white-box gradient-based attacks (as described in Sec-
tion 2.1). However, because they do not have access to the
gradient, these types of attacks instead estimate the gradient
by repeatedly querying the model.
• Boundary following attacks, in contrast, first identify the
decision boundary of the neural network, at a potentially
far-away point, and then take steps following the boundary
to locate the nearest point on the boundary to the target
image.
We evaluate against one representative attack from each category.
4.1 Attack Setup
For each attack studied, we use the targeted variant, where the
adversary generates an adversarial example chosen so that the
resulting adversarial example x is classified as a target class t and
is within a distance ϵ of an original image x . The original image
and target class are chosen randomly. We call an attack successful
if the ℓ∞ distortion is below ε = 0.05. While most white-box work
on CIFAR-10 considers the smaller distortion bound of ε = 0.031 ≈
8/255, we choose this slightly larger distortion because black-box
attacks are known to be more difficult to generate and so we give
the adversary slightly more power to compensate.
NES [22] is one of the two most prominent gradient-estimation
attacks (along with SPSA [39]). It estimates the gradient at a point
by averaging the confidence scores of randomly sampled nearby
points, and then uses projected gradient descent [30] to perturb an
image of the target class until it is sufficiently close to the original
image. In the hard label case, the confidence score for a point is
approximated by taking a Monte Carlo sample of nearby points,
and then computing the score for a class as the fraction of nearby
points with that class.
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Attack Success Rate Num. Queries Detections
NES 100% 325,200±153,300 6,377
Boundary 100% 14,720±8,923 288
Table 1: Success rate of unmodified attacks on a neural net-
workprotectedwith our scheme.While attacks succeedwith
100% probability, the attacks trigger hundreds to thousands
of detections.
The Boundary Attack [6] was the first attack to propose fol-
lowing the decision boundary to generate black-box adversarial
examples. Since its publication, there have been multiple proposals
to improve this attack [23, 26]. We evaluate our defense on the
vanilla boundary attack; the other attacks are more query efficient,
but at their core still perform the same operation. To compare di-
rectly with the NES attack, we use ℓ∞ distance with the boundary
attack (instead of the usual ℓ2 distance).
4.2 Results
We run the default, unmodified implementations of each attack
against our scheme and find that they can be detected. The results
are presented in Table 1. (Attack-specific parameters for NES are
given in Section 6.1.) An attack is considered successful if an ad-
versarial example is found within an ℓ∞ distortion of ϵ = 0.05
from the original image, with the correct target class. We terminate
each attack as soon as it finds such an example. Each attack does
eventually succeed at a high rate, but is detected frequently with at
least 200 detections on average. Thus, an attacker would need to
create at least 200 accounts in order to generate a single adversarial
example with these attacks. This demonstrates that our query se-
quence based scheme can reliably detect existing black box attacks.
5 QUERY BLINDING
While showing that our proposed defense can detect existing attacks
is a useful first step, it is not sufficient for a complete evaluation.
We must also evaluate whether our defense can detect future at-
tacks. Doing this requires developing adaptive attacks specifically
designed to bypass the defense proposal [8].
Thus, we introduce query blinding2: a general strategy which
can be used to hide the query sequence from the defender. Query
blinding is the most effective attack strategy we have found to date
against our scheme. At its core, the objective of a query blinding
attack is to learn the value of f (x), for some specific x , without
actually revealing the example x to the defender. We define two
functions: a randomized blinding function b(x ; r ) = {x ′0,x ′1, . . . ,x ′n }
that maps from one example to a set of modified examples so that
∥x ′i − x ∥ ≥ ε , and a revealing function r (f (x ′0), f (x ′1), . . . , f (x ′n ))
that is designed to estimate f (x) from the classifier outputs. For
the majority of this paper we restrict ourselves to the case where
∥b(x)∥ = 1. In the appendix we give an example of a more so-
phisticated blinding function that deviates from this simplifying
assumption.
2We call this query blinding because of its similarities to blind signatures [11].
5.1 Image Transformations
Image processing transformations, such as image translation and
brightness adjustment, are natural and readily available blinding
functions. Let x be the image that an attacker would like to query
the model for, f (x) be the model’s output for the query, andTc (x ; r )
be a randomized image processing transform (e.g., by rotating it or
shifting it by a random amount c); then we set b(x ; r ) = {Tc (x ; r )}.
Because the purpose of our blinding function is to fool the query-
detector by transforming a sequence of queries which are pairwise
similar to a sequence of queries which are not, we would like the
distortion between the original image and the transformed image
to be large. For example, for a 3 x 32 x 32 CIFAR-10 image, adjusting
the brightness (i.e., individual pixel values) by adding just 0.05 to
each pixel increases the ℓ2 distortion by 0.05×
√
3 × 32 × 32 = 2.77.
Critically, after distortion, these transformations still retain the pri-
mary content of the image, and a model with high accuracy should
produce relatively similar outputs for the original and transformed
images, so the corresponding revealing function for an image pro-
cessing transformation is simply r (f (x ′)) = f (x ′). We examined
eight possible transformations:
• Uniform Noise: add uniform noise to the image, where the
noise is drawn from a uniform distribution c ∼ U (−r , r ).
• Translate: translate the image horizontally and vertically by
ch and cv fractional pixels, where ch and cv are sampled
randomly from a uniform distribution ch ∼ U (−r , r ) and
cv ∼ U (−r , r ), using bilinear interpolation and filling in
empty space with zeroes.
• Rotate: rotate the image cπ radians, where c is sampled ran-
domly from a uniform distribution c ∼ U (−r , r ), using bilin-
ear interpolation and filling in empty space with zeroes.
• Pixel-wise Scale: scale all pixels by the same factor c , sampled
randomly from a uniform distribution c ∼ U (1 − r , 1 + r ).
• Crop and Resize: crop the image to box coordinates of [c, c, 1−
c, 1 − c] and then resize the image to its original size (box
coordinates [0, 0, 1, 1]) using bilinear interpolation, where c
is sampled randomly from a uniform distribution c ∼ U (0, r ).
• Brightness: adjust the brightness of the image by adding to
each pixel the same constant c , where c is sampled randomly
from a uniform distribution c ∼ U (−r , r ).
• Contrast: adjust the contrast of the image by a random con-
trast factor c , where c is sampled randomly from a uniform
distribution c ∼ U (r , 1).
• Gaussian Noise: add Gaussian noise to the image, where the
noise is drawn from a Gaussian distribution c ∼ r × N(0, I ).
These transformations are also used when training the similarity
encoder (Section 3.2).
5.2 Auto-Encoder Attack
We also consider attacks that involve learning the blinding function.
Specifically, we train an auto-encoder neural network α(x). Nor-
mally, auto-encoders are trained so that α(x) ≈ x . In our case we
instead train a randomized auto-encoder α(x ; r ) to satisfy two prop-
erties: (1) ∥α(x ; r1) − α(x ; r2)∥ |2 is large, but (2) f (α(x ; r )) ≈ f (x).
Satisfying property (1) ensures that the augmented image will evade
detection by the encoder, while property (2) ensures that the actual
classification of the image will remain unchanged.
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Specifically, we train the auto-encoder to minimize the loss
ℓ(x) = H (f (α(x , r )), f (x)) − c ·min(∥α(x ; r1) − α(x ; r2)∥22 ,d2)
where H (·) is the cross-entropy loss between the two distributions,
c is a constant that controls the relative importance of the two loss
terms, and d is a constant that sets the desired ℓ2 distance between
transformed examples.
We train the auto-encoder with stochastic gradient descent for
10 epochs on the CIFAR-10 training data. In order to ensure that we
are not “cheating” by training on the exact function f (·) which we
will be attacking, we train a new classification neural network f ′(·)
on 10% of the CIFAR-10 training data. In practice, we set c = 1.
To determine the threshold d , we try values between 2 and 20
and pick the one that is most effective at fooling the detector. We
found that in practice d = 10 is well-balanced between being big
enough so the detector is fooled, but not so big that f (α(x ; r )) is
substantially different from f (x).
5.3 Increasing Attack Diversity
While the above query-blinding attacks generate blinded images
at a large distance from the original, if we are unlucky they might
generate two blinded images which are nearly identical. This is true
especially when we generate a large number of transformed images
xi = b(x , ri ). By the birthday paradox, we should expect that as we
generate increasingly many images, an increasingly large fraction
will be similar to each other, which might cause the attack to be
detected. We improve our attacks so they avoid querying multiple
blinded images that are too similar.
For simplicity of analysis, assume for the moment that our de-
fense relied exclusively on the ℓ2 distance between images being
less than some threshold τ to detect attacks. After the attacker has
made queries q0,q1, . . . ,qj−1, he could check whether or not mak-
ing the query qj = b(x ; r j ) would be detected as an attack against
his own history. If it would be, he could simply re-sample a new
value r j′ and generate a new candidate query qj = b(x ; r j′) until
he obtained a sample that is above the detection threshold. This
greedy approach is simple and reasonably effective.
One can do even better by filtering all queries in advance. Begin
by generating a large number of candidates xi = b(x , ri ). Construct
a graphG where each candidate xi is a node, and connect node i to
node j if the distance between xi and x j is less than the threshold τ
(i.e., querying bothwould result in a detection). Formally,G = (V ,E)
where V = 1, . . .N and E = {(i, j) : ∥xi − x j ∥ < τ }. If the defender
uses k = 2, identifying the maximum subset of examples that would
not cause a detection by a ℓ2-based detector reduces to finding the
maximum independent set of this graph G. While the maximum
independent set in general is NP-hard to approximate, we find
that simple approximation algorithms identify sub-graphs with a
cardinality on average twice as large as greedy querying.
We use these methods to improve our query blinding attacks.
Even though our defense actually uses an encoder and does not
rely directly on ℓ2 distance, we find that this approach still reduces
the number of detections by promoting attack sample diversity.
6 ADAPTIVE ATTACK EVALUATION
Given that our proposed defense effectively prevents existing black-
box attacks, we now study whether or not it can prevent more
sophisticated attacks. We find that while it is possible to degrade
the effectiveness of the defense, we can not defeat it completely.
We study three categories of attacks: gradient attacks (specifically,
variants of NES with various kinds of query blinding), boundary-
following attacks (specifically, variants of the boundary attack with
query blinding), and hybrid attacks (which combine gradient attacks
with a surrogate model).
6.1 The NES Attack
We use the NES attack as one starting point for attacking our
scheme. To generate a targeted adversarial example a given in-
put x , NES generates an adversarial example by seeding it with an
image x ′ of the target class (i.e., that is already adversarial). NES
then uses projected gradient descent to slowly reduce the distor-
tion between this image (which is already the target class) and the
original example x until it is within ϵ of the original image, while
still being classified as the target class.
In order to estimate the gradient at any given location x , NES
uses finite differences on a random Gaussian basis. Full details can
be found in [22], but simplified, the gradient is estimated by: (1)
sampling n instances of Gaussian noise δ1, . . . ,δn ∼ N(0, 1) and
adding them each to x as θi = x +σδi to generate n basis points, (2)
for each basis point θi , estimating the confidence scores at θi , (3)
estimating the gradient at x using these estimated confidence scores
and then taking a step in the direction of the estimated gradient.
The confidence score at θi is estimated by querying the labels for s
points near θi chosen randomly from a sampling ball of l∞ radius µ
and computing the proportion of each class as the estimate for that
class’s confidence score. The default attack parameters for NES are
σ = 0.001, n = 4, s = 50, µ = 0.001, and learning rate = 0.01 [22];
we consider below how to adjust them.
An attacker aware of our defense may attempt to modify the
NES attack in order to increase the distance between queries. We
explore two natural modifications to the NES attack that an attacker
could make: adjusting the NES parameters, and query blinding.
6.1.1 Parameter Tweaking. One natural modification is to adjust
NES’s parameters to make it harder for our defense to detect the
attack. The attacker could increase µ, the radius of the sampling
ball used when sampling points to estimate the confidence score
for an image. The original version of the NES attack uses a radius
of µ = 0.001, but in experiments we found that the attack is also
reasonably successful with radii up to µ = 0.064 (see Figure 3).
When we set µ = 0.064, the 50-nearest-neighbor distance between
an image and the s sampled points is on average 2.32, significantly
larger than the 50-nearest-neighbor distance of just 0.032 if we set
µ = 0.001.
The attacker could also increase σ so that the sampled Gaussian
basis points θi are further apart. Additionally, the attacker could
decrease s so that fewer queries nearθi are generatingwhen estimat-
ing confidence scores. We found that the attack remains reasonably
successful even when s is reduced to s = 2, and the attack becomes
harder to detect, so we used s = 2 in our experiments. Figure 5 in
the appendix reports on the effect of modifying this parameter.
Steven Chen, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.064 0.096 0.128
Confidence Estimation Radius
0
20
40
60
80
100
P
e
rc
e
n
t
NES attack success vs. estimation radius
Success
Failure
Figure 3: NES attack success rate, as we vary the sampling
radius µ. For each value of µ, we ran the NES attack was run
100 times; the attack was considered successful if it found
an adversarial example (of a randomly chosen target class
and within ϵ = 0.05) within 5 million queries.
6.1.2 Query Blinding. The second natural modification is for an
attacker to use query blinding to transform each query, as described
previously. In particular, we modify the confidence score estimation
procedure (step 2 from the previous attack description) to sample
s points using the different transformations listed in Section 5.1
instead of sampling from a ℓ∞ ball of uniform radius. The parame-
ters for each transformation are normalized so that the expected ℓ2
distortion from each transformation is equal to 2.32; exact values
are given in Appendix B. We selected a constant of 2.32 to match
the ℓ2 distortion of setting µ = 0.064. (Note that µ is now only
applicable when using the original strategy of sampling from a ball
of ℓ∞ radius µ). We used the same parameters when training the
similarity encoder.
When running the NES attack, each time we query the classifier
we preprocess the image with one strategy. We use default parame-
ter values for the NES attack, except we set s = 2 to make it harder
to detect. Table 2 shows the effectiveness of different transforma-
tions. For some transformations, like uniform and Gaussian noise,
the NES attack fails completely. However, the NES attack works
even better with brightness and pixel-scale transformations than
the original confidence estimation procedure of uniform noise. This
suggests that estimating the confidence score for an image may be
more accurate with certain image transformations than others.
For all transformations, each attack will trigger at least one hun-
dred detections (on average), so our defense is effective at detecting
these query blinding attacks. The exact attacker cost corresponding
to this number of detections is quantified further in Section 7.
For this level of transformation distortion, the similarity encoder
offers little benefit over ℓ2 distance on images. This is understand-
able, as for k = 50, the ℓ2 detection threshold is δ = 5.069 when
using ℓ2 distance on images, which is greater than the ℓ2 distortion
of 2.32 introduced by these transformations. We also evaluated
against attacks that use transformations that introduce a greater
distortion. Specifically, we increase σ to σ = 0.01 (the highest value
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: For each image in the test set (left) we show four
possible images transformed by our auto-encoder (right)
that have the same classification label but have high ℓ2 dis-
tance from each other.
found experimentally such that the attack still succeeds reasonably
often) and increase the distortion parameter for each transformation
so that the expected ℓ2 distortion introduced by the transformation
is equal to 5.10 (see Appendix B). Results for these higher-distortion
attacks are shown in Table 2.
Against these higher-distortion transformations, the similarity
encoder is more effective at detecting attacks compared to ℓ2 dis-
tance on images, resulting in 6–8×more detections. As explained in
Section 7, this significantly increases the cost to the attacker. This
demonstrates that the similarity encoder significantly increases
robustness against adaptive query blinding attacks. The number of
detections increases when using higher-distortion transformations
vs lower-distortion transformations; this is because the attack needs
more queries on average to succeed (due to less precise gradient
estimates), resulting in more opportunities to detect the attack.
The learned auto-encoder is more effective than simple image
transformations. (We give examples of the auto-encoded images
which are sent to the classifier in Figure 4.) The auto-encoder is
particularly effective at defeating a defense that uses ℓ2 distance
on images, as it is trained to map an image to a blinded version
with large ℓ2 distortion. However, our full defense with a similarity
encoder remains able to detect the auto-encoder attack. Future
work may be able to improve the auto-encoder attack by training
the auto-encoder to fool surrogate similarity encoders.
6.2 The Boundary Attack
The boundary attack [6] is a gradient-free attack that starts with an
image of the target class and then makes steps alternating between
moving the image along the decision boundary (while remaining
adversarial) and steps which move towards the original image.
In more detail, the boundary attack alternates between the two
following operations:
• Inwards step.Given the current proposed adversarial exam-
ple x ′i , we take a small step ε in the direction of the original
image x and let x ′i+1 = x
′
i + ε · (x − x ′i ).• Orthogonal (boundary-following) step. Starting from the
current adversarial example x ′i , take a step along a random
direction r orthogonal to x − x ′i , subject to the constraint
that f (x ′i + r ) = f (x ′i ).
Stateful Detection of Black-Box Adversarial Attacks
Attack Attack Success Rate Num. Queries Detections Detections with ℓ2 detector
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NES (query blinding: uniform noise) 1% 15,700±0 308 308
NES (query blinding: translate) 4% 6,710±400 131 131
NES (query blinding: rotate) 7% 10,200±684 198 199
NES (query blinding: scale) 27% 12,600±882 246 246
NES (query blinding: crop and resize) 7% 6,130±247 119 119
NES (query blinding: brightness) 55% 13,500±780 264 263
NES (query blinding: contrast) 23% 11,200±777 219 219
NES (query blinding: Gaussian noise) 0% n/a n/a n/a
H
ig
h NES (query blinding: brightness) 43% 24,500±2,630 481 60
NES (query blinding: scale) 42% 25,700±3,000 504 88
NES (query blinding: contrast) 37% 19,100±4,240 375 85
NES (query blinding: auto-encoder) 76% 13,400±8,400 97 12
Table 2: The success rate of NES attacks with query blinding. The fourth column shows the average number of times the attack
is detected my our defense before a single adversarial example is generated (i.e., the number of accounts an attacker would
need to defeat our defense). The fifth column shows the average number of times the attack is detected, if we use a simplified
defense with ℓ2 distance on images instead of the similarity encoder. Simple transformations, such as rotation or contrast
adjustment, are still detected by our defense, even when the distortion introduced is large. The auto-encoder attack is more
effective but is still detected by our defense. These results show the value of the similarity encoder; it makes our defense
significantly more effective against several attacks.
6.2.1 Parameter Tweaking. An attacker may also use different vari-
ants of the boundary attack in an attempt to avoid detection by our
scheme. First, the attacker could increase the step sizes to be large
enough so that they are not detected by our similarity encoder;
in our experiments, we found that the boundary attack no longer
converges after this change. Second, instead of sampling random
directions from a Gaussian distribution, as in the original attack,
an attacker could sample from Perlin noise. This substitution was
shown to increase success rate with a limited number of queries
(fewer than 15,000 queries) [7]. However, we find that this strat-
egy is not effective at the higher number of queries allowed in our
evaluation (beyond 20,000 queries). This is likely due to the decreas-
ing marginal improvement of this Perlin substitution as queries
increase, an effect observed in [7].
6.2.2 Query Blinding. Wealso evaluate the effectiveness of a bound-
ary attack with query blinding. In particular, we preprocess all
queries made by the boundary attack with the transformation that
worked best with the NES attack (brightness).
6.2.3 Results. Table 3 shows our ability to detect these versions
of the boundary attack. We allow each attack trial to make up to
200,000 queries, the same number of queries made by the best NES
attack variants. Perlin noise does not perform better than the origi-
nal boundary attack, likely due to the observed decreasing utility of
the Perlin noise at these higher query numbers [7]. Preprocessing
queries with the brightness transform is also ineffective: it does not
decrease the number of detections while significantly decreasing
the boundary attack’s success rate. We found that the success rate
decreases because the boundary attack adjusts its step size accord-
ing to the local geometry of the boundary (estimated from past
queries); the preprocessing causes the attack to misapproximate the
local boundary geometry and reduce the step size too drastically,
causing the attack to converge prematurely before finding a point
within distance ϵ from the original image x and fail to make fur-
ther progress. Consequently, the original boundary attack is more
effective than any of the variants we studied.
Our defense is effective at detecting the boundary attack: an
attacker would need to create 200 accounts to create a single adver-
sarial example.
6.3 Hybrid Query Based Surrogate Attack
Gradient-estimation query based attacks by design necessarily
make a sequence of queries which are all highly self-similar, and
our detection defense is especially well suited to these types of
attacks. Thus, we now consider an alternate attack strategy. At
a high level, we will construct a locally-similar surrogate model
[32] and then perform a gradient-based attack on this model and
transfer the attack. Specifically, for an image x , we randomly sam-
ple n points, xfar = x + δ , δ ∼ U (D, 1), where D is large enough
that querying these points is unlikely to trigger the defense, and
we query the sampled points for their labels. To ensure that some
training points of x ’s class are present, we also samplem points,
xnear = x + δ , δ ∼ U (0,d), where d is small, but we do not query
these points; instead, we assume their labels are of the same class
as x , which is normally the case unless x is very close to a decision
boundary. We train a surrogate model on these n +m points, and
then run the white-box attack from Carlini and Wagner [10] with
high confidence (κ = 100), in order to generate an adversarial exam-
ple that hopefully transfers. In our scheme, the similarity encoder
is not made public, so the attacker would not know the exact value
of D to use, but in our experiments we artificially give the attacker
the extra power to know the optimal D, to give the attacker every
possible advantage.
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Attack Attack Success Rate Num. Queries Detections
Boundary attack (normal) 100% 14,700±892 288
Boundary attack (Perlin noise) 40% 31,100±976 609
Boundary attack (query blinding: brightness) 2% 24,100±1,470 473
Boundary attack (query blinding: auto-encoder) 61% 34,200 ± 8,000 240
Hybrid surrogate attack, untargeted 14% 8,192±0 82
Table 3: Effectiveness of the boundary attack and the hybrid surrogate attack. Our defense is able to detect all of these attacks.
In our experiments, we found that targeted version of this attack
did not succeed, as it was difficult to find enough points with the
target class through random sampling. Therefore, for the evaluation
of this attack, we focus on untargeted attacks and exclusively target
the next-most-likely class, instead of a random class. We selected
D as D = 0.09, by experimentally finding the necessary value such
that samples would on average have a higher similarity encoding
distance than the threshold, and d = 0.01. We use a three layer
CNN architecture (described in the appendix) for the surrogate
model, and trained it for 50 epochs per attack. Table 3 shows the
effectiveness of this attack. This attack is able to succeed at a modest
but non-trivial rate, while having 3–8× fewer detections compared
to the other attacks. This indicates that there may be potential
for constructing query-based attacks that use information from
surrogate models to make the attack stealthier; but we have not
found a concrete attack that can completely defeat our defense.
We leave it to future work to explore improving such attacks (e.g.,
informed instead of random sampling).
6.4 Attacking the Similarity Encoder
An attacker might try to defeat our scheme by fooling the similarity
encoder, e.g., generating a blinded version x ′ of a query x such
that the similarity encoder considers x ,x ′ to be dissimilar, yet they
have the same classification. Because the similarity encoder is kept
secret in our defense, there is no way to perform a white-box attack
to construct such blinded queries. There is no direct way to mount
a black-box query attack, either: there is no way to supply an image
x and learn its encoding, or submit a pair of images x0,x1 and learn
whether they have similar encodings.
This leaves only side-channel attacks on the similarity encoder.
For instance, an attacker could create a new account, submit a
batch of k + 1 images, and observe whether the account is cancelled
or not; this reveals whether the k + 1st image was similar to the
previous k . However, such an attack would be very slow. Each
k + 1 queries reveal only a single bit of information about the
similarity encoder. As constructing a surrogate model or mounting
query-based attacks typically require tens or hundreds of thousands
of examples, such an attack would require creating an infeasible
number of fake accounts. Information-theoretically, to maximize
the amount of information revealed per query, the optimal strategy
is to issue k = 50 queries, then issue subsequent queries chosen
so that each has about a p ≈ 1/18 chance of triggering detection
and observe which one causes the account to be cancelled; this
reveals about 5.6 bits of information per account and issues about
68 queries per account (on average). We expect that it would still
require thousands of fake accounts, so is unlikely to be effective.
If necessary, a defender could further reduce the amount of
information revealed by the side channel by delaying account can-
cellation. For example, if the defender waits until the number of
queries reaches the next power of two before banning an attacker’s
account, and if no user makes more than 220 queries, then each
account cancellation reveals at most lg 21 ≈ 4.4 bits of informa-
tion about the encoder, at the cost that direct attacks might re-
quire only half as many fake accounts. The parameters could be
optimized: for instance, if accounts are cancelled only at queries
numbered ⌈50 × 1.1i ⌉ for i = 1, 2, . . . and if no user makes more
than 220 queries, then each account cancellation reveals at most
lg log1.1(220/50) ≈ 6.7 bits of information about the encoder, and
the delayed cancellation allows the attacker to make at most 10%
more free queries; thus our best attack (NES with auto-encoder
query blinding) would still require 97/1.1 ≈ 88 fake accounts with
this side-channel defense in place.
7 ECONOMICS OF PERFORMING AN ATTACK
Assuming our defense was in place, what would the economics
look like for an attacker who wished to completely avoid detection,
using a single account? We consider a thought experiment where
an attacker is given information for whether or not each query to
the detection scheme will be detected as part of an attack sequence
and knows k . Normally, the attacker will not know this information,
as the encoder is not made public in our scheme. How should an
adversary proceed to optimally generate an adversarial example
in this setting? Recall that we proposed two instantiations of our
defense: a time-bounded history of prior queries, or a history storing
a fixed number of queries (e.g., in a circular buffer). We analyze
both schemes below.
Case 1: time-bounded buffer. Suppose we store each query until t
hours have passed. Then, an attack that triggers d detections would
take an attacker dt hours to execute if the attacker wishes to avoid
being detected. The most effective attack against our scheme that
we have found (NES with auto-encoder query blinding) triggers 97
detections, so if we store queries for 100 hours, generating a single
adversarial example without being detected would take over a year.
In practice, the defender can set the buffer duration according
to their resource capacity. For example, Google’s Cloud Vision API
currently has a rate limit of 1800 queries per minute per user, so
a user who continuously makes the maximum number of queries
could make 10.8M queries per 100 hours. Our similarity encoder
maps each input to a 256-dimensional output, so storing these
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10.8M vectors (with 16-bit floating point values) would require
5.5GB of storage. Google’s cloud storage is currently priced at
$0.026/GB/month per user, so the storage cost to the provider of
the query buffer would be at most $0.14/month per user, and far
less for most users (as we expect few users continuously max out
the rate limits).
Case 2: query-bounded buffer. Suppose we always store the last
N queries made by each user. Then an attacker who knows which
queries will trigger a detection could avoid detection by flushing
the buffer (by making N extra random queries) just before being
detected. With this strategy, an attack that triggers d detections
would take an attacker about dN total queries to execute if the
attacker wishes to avoid being detected.
For example, Google’s Cloud Vision API currently costs $1.50
USD per 1000 queries. If the buffer stores N = 104 examples, our
most effective attack would require about 97 × 104 queries to exe-
cute without being detected, which would cost about $1500 USD, a
sizeable amount of money for an adversary to pay for generating
a single adversarial image. For comparison, without our defense,
the best attack we tried would cost about $20 USD. The cost to
the provider of storing a buffer of size N = 104 would be about
$0.0007/month per user, at Google cloud storage’s current prices.
8 ZERO QUERY DEFENSE
Our scheme detects query-based attacks, but cannot detect zero-
query attacks. We propose that our scheme be combined with
an existing defense against black-box zero-query attacks. Cur-
rently,ensemble adversarial training (EAT) is one of the most ef-
fective defenses against black-box zero-query attacks [37]. EAT
generates white-box adversarial examples with distortion ϵ on an
ensemble of static models with different architectures and weights,
and trains the defended model on these examples. This procedure
has been demonstrated to make the defended model robust against
adversarial examples transferred from a holdout surrogate model,
while resulting in only a modest decrease in the defended model’s
clean accuracy (on non-adversarial examples). Accordingly, we train
a ResNet50v1 classifier for CIFAR-10 using EAT, with ϵ = 0.05, to
construct a model robust to zero-query attacks of ϵ = 0.05. Further
training details can be found in the appendix.
To evaluate the EAT-defended model, ResNet50v1-EAT, against
zero-query transfer attacks, we generated adversarial examples
(over the CIFAR-10 test set) on a holdout ResNet74v2 model, and
then saw if those examples transferred (i.e., were also adversarial
for the ResNet50v1-EAT). To give the attacker every advantage,
we trained the ResNet74v2 surrogate model on the same CIFAR-10
training set, with the same training parameters. We used FGSM [18]
and a clipped modification of the Carlini-Wagner (CW) ℓ2 attack
[10] to generate adversarial examples (with ϵ = 0.05 and κ = 100
for the CW attack). Table 5 shows the success rate of attacks against
the defended ResNet50v1-EAT.
Compared to the undefended model, the EAT-defended model
is noticeably more robust to all three methods of transfer attack.
The EAT-defended model does incur a noticeable decrease in clean
accuracy, but in exchange we obtain substantial robustness against
transfer attacks for a fairly large value of ϵ = 0.05 (for reference,
[37] used ϵ = 0.06 for defending models trained for much higher
dimensional, 256x256x3 ImageNet images). In practice, the defender
may tune ϵ according to their demands between accuracy and
robustness.
Our defense remains effective an EAT-defended model. We reran
the best query-based attack variants on this EAT-defended model;
results are shown in Table 4. Our scheme is still able to detect query-
based attacks frequently, and it appears that the EAT model may
even reduce the success rate of query-based attacks.
9 RELATEDWORK
To our knowledge, our scheme is the first to use the history of
queries in order to detect query-based black-box attacks for creating
adversarial examples. The most closely related work is PRADA
[24], which detects black-box model extraction attacks using the
history of queries. They examine the ℓ2 distance between images
and raising an alarm if the distribution of these distances is not
Gaussian. Because they use ℓ2 distance on images, their scheme is
not robust to query blinding, and because they examine only the
distribution of distances, their scheme is not robust to insertion of
dummy queries to make the distribution Gaussian [24, §V.C]. They
do not consider how to detect creation of adversarial examples.
Much previous work has explored stateless detection of whether
an individual query is adversarial, usually by checking if the query is
out of the distribution of normal/benign data [15, 20, 31]. However,
effective detection under this stateless threat model has proven
difficult [9].
Other work has been done to defend against white-box attacks,
such as adversarial training [30]. Such defenses are complementary
to our defense: we can apply our detection strategy on top of any
model. In our paper we study our defense on top of a non-robust
model for simplicity and to accurately measure the value of this
type of defense. Recent work on robust similarity [25] could also
be useful for improving our scheme.
There are other query-based black-box attacks, but they often
follow either a similar gradient-estimation approach as NES, or a
boundary-following approach similar to the boundary attack. For
example, SPSA [39], another gradient-estimation attack, estimates
the gradient with Bernoulli instead of Gaussian directions. Bound-
ary attack variants, like Boundary++ [23], RED [26], and qFool [29],
are more query efficient but still follow the same core approach of
querying along the boundary.
Transfer attacks are a common approach in the zero-query set-
ting [32]. We explore combining our defense with ensemble adver-
sarial training [37], currently one of the most effective defenses
against zero-query transfer attacks, but the recent Sitatapatra de-
fense may also be effective [34].
The approach for query blinding takes inspiration from previous
work in signature blinding [11] and mimicry attacks [41].
10 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Our defense assumes that the model can be kept secret. If the
attacker can learn the model weights (e.g., through a model extrac-
tion attack [38]) then our proposed defense again is not effective. It
would be interesting to explore stateful methods to detect model
extraction attacks [24].
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Attack Attack Success Rate Num. Queries Detections
NES (best) 17% 22,510±17,000 442
Boundary (best) 95% 19,928±24,300 391
Hybrid Surrogate (untargeted) 5% 8,192+/-0 82
Table 4: The effectiveness of our defense with an EAT-defended model. Our defense still detects query-based attacks, and EAT
makes the defended model robust to zero-query attacks. Each attack was allowed to make up to 200,000 queries, and was run
on the same set of randomly selected 100 images and target classes. The number of queries and detections are an average over
the successful attacks.
Model Clean FGSM(u) CW(u) CW(t)
ResNet50v1 7.8% 73.8% 59.1% 18.8%
ResNet50v1-EAT 14.6% 14.4% 16.4% 1.0%
Table 5: Robustness against transfer attacks of an unpro-
tected ResNet compared to an EAT-defended ResNet. The
second column shows the error rate on clean examples; the
subsequent columns show the success rate of transfer at-
tacks using untargeted FGSM, and untargeted and targeted
variants of the attack from Carlini and Wagner [10].
We evaluated our defense on an image recognition task. It would
be interesting to explore whether similar ideas can be applied to
other application domains as well, by constructing a suitable simi-
larity encoder for that domain.
Our proposed defense only prevents attacks which attempt to
generate an adversarial example near a specific image x . If the
adversary were content with finding any image that is misclassified,
then an adversary could simply generate random candidate inputs
and wait until a test error randomly occurred [16]. For example,
because our CIFAR-10 classifier reaches 92% accuracy an adversary
who wanted to identify any error would be expected to succeed
after trying just 13 images. This attack is not specific to our defense,
and would work equally well on any other defense to adversarial
examples.
The specific auto-encoder attack transformation we develop
is explicitly designed to target the defense we have constructed,
and likely future defenses could detect this specific attack strategy.
However, we believe the general query-blinding strategy is an
interesting research direction to pursue to develop stronger attacks.
Our proposed defense was only evaluated in the “hard-label”
setting where the adversary receives only the classification label,
without confidence scores. Designing a defense in the “soft-label”
black-box setting, where the model does return confidence scores,
is an interesting direction for future work. In Appendix E we give a
proposed attack which which demonstrates the potential difficulties
in solving this case.
It may be possible to train a stronger defense that achieves higher
robustness against query-blinding attacks through adversarial train-
ing. We have a similarity encoder that is designed to detect similar
images, and an auto-encoder that is designed to produce images
that fool the similarity detector. Similar to GANs, it is possible that
jointly and adversarially training them might provide make the
similarity encoder more robust.
11 CONCLUSION
Defenses against white-box adversarial examples have thus far
proven elusive; thus, we advocate for increased study into black-
box defenses against adversarial examples. In the black-box setting,
the academic community has thus far studied only stateless de-
fenses; we argue that stateful defenses give the defender a new
advantage and deserve attention. Towards this end, we propose
a simple scheme that detects the process of adversarial example
generation. By combining our proposed approach with existing
defenses that prevent transferability attacks, we construct the first
unified defense that might offer black-box robustness.
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A CNN ARCHITECTURE
Layer Filters Size Details
Conv 32 3 × 3 ReLU
Conv 32 3 × 3 ReLU
Max Pool 2 × 2 stride = 2
Dropout p = 0.25
Conv 64 3 × 3 ReLU
Conv 64 3 × 3 ReLU
Max Pool 2 × 2 stride = 2
Dropout p = 0.25
Dense 512 ReLU
Dropout p = 0.5
Dense 256
Table 6: Architecture for three layer CNNused for similarity
encoder (section 3.4) and hybrid attack (section 6.3).
B QUERY BLINDING
B.1 Transformation Parameters
Parameters for the low-distortion transformations (expected ℓ2 =
2.32), their parameters (r ) are listed in Table 7, and those for high-
distortion transformations (expected ℓ2 = 5.10) are in Table 8.
B.2 NES Parameters
We also explored reducing s , the number of samples per confidence
score estimation, to s = 2 versus the original value s = 50, as a
lower s should result in less groups of k = 50 neighboring points
being significantly near each other and accordingly less detections.
This comes at a cost of potentially less accurate estimations of the
confidence scores, so the adjustment of s is experimented with in
Transform r
Uniform Noise 0.064
Translate 0.45
Rotate 0.018
Pixel-wise Scale 0.17
Crop and Resize 0.04
Brightness 0.09
Contrast 0.55
Gaussian Noise 0.095
Table 7: Transformation parameters (low distortion)
Transform r
Pixel-wise Scale 0.36
Brightness 0.204
Contrast 0.79
Table 8: Transformation parameters (high distortion)
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combination with query blinding, whereby different transforma-
tions (some that may be more accurate for estimating the scores
than others) are used to sample points for estimating the scores.
Additionally, a higher value of s increases the chance that the attack
will succeed, at the cost of increasing the number of detections due
to the corresponding higher number of queries. The comparison of
s = 2 versus s = 50, allowing up to 200, 000 or 5, 000, 000 queries
respectively, over different image transformations is shown in Fig-
ure 5. Each attack was run on the same set of randomly selected
100 images and target classes, and each metric is the average over
the successful attacks.
C ENSEMBLE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
We pre-trained a ResNet50v1 on CIFAR-10 (accuracy 92.2%). Then
we train it on adversarial examples generated on an ensemble of
trained ResNetswith different architectures: ResNet44v1, ResNet56v2,
and ResNet74v1. Adversarial examples were generated using FGSM
[18] with ϵ = 0.05. The network was trained for 100 epochs, where
the adversarial examples for each epoch were generated from a ran-
domly selected model from the ensemble and the defended model,
and one adversarial example was generated per image in the CIFAR-
10 training set.
D A DIFFICULT SOFT-LABEL CASE
Our paper focuses on the “hard-label” threat model where the
adversary only is only given the label with highest confidence score.
In contrast, the “soft-label” threat model gives the adversary full
access to the output probabilities of the model (the full output of the
softmax layer). We present one possible attack that demonstrates
the increased capabilities for an attacker when given access to the
probability distribution. In particular, this attack shows that our
hard-label defense scheme does not scale to the soft-label setting.
To obtain the classification of a sample x we define the blinding
and revealing functions as follows:
• To blind x , select a random unit-vector direction r and let
b(x) = {x + d · r ,x + (d + ϵ) · r }
where the distance d is a hyperparameter of the attack.
• Recover f (x) by letting
r (y0,y1) = y0 + d
ϵ
· (y0 − y1).
This attack works due to the fact that neural networks, despite
being non-linear functions globally, often locally behave as if they
were linear functions.
To increase the accuracy of the estimate of f (x) the above proce-
dure can be generalized by selecting multiple random directions ri
and averaging the results. We experimentally verified that this type
of attack approach is effective and allows the soft-label variant of
NES [22] to succeed against our query-based detector.
Stateful Detection of Black-Box Adversarial Attacks
s = 2: Attack Success Rate Num. of Queries ℓ2 Detections Similarity Encoding Detections
Uniform Noise 1% 15,695 308 308
Translate 4% 6,714 131 131
Rotate 7% 10,175 199 198
Scale 27% 12,567 246 246
Crop and Resize 7% 6,132 119 119
Brightness 55% 13,503 263 264
Contrast 23% 11,197 219 219
Gaussian Noise 0% n/a n/a n/a
s = 50: Attack Success Rate Num. of Queries ℓ2 Detections Similarity Encoding Detections
Uniform Noise 15% 453,651 8,895 8,895
Translate 28% 293,586 5,755 5,756
Rotate 50% 295,022 5,782 5,784
Scale 83% 337,346 6,607 6,614
Crop and Resize 43% 249,717 4,895 4,895
Brightness 45% 277,864 5,437 5,447
Contrast 23% 253,325 4,966 4,966
Gaussian Noise 0% n/a n/a n/a
Figure 5: Attack success and detection rate between s = 2 and s = 50.
